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State Sovereign Immunity and Privatization: Can 
Eleventh Amendment Immunity Extend to Private 
Entities? 
Justin C. Carlin* 
ABSTRACT 
Since the privatization-boom of the 1980s and 1990s, state govern-
ments have transferred a large number of traditionally public functions to 
private firms by: (1) privatizing traditionally public entities, and (2) con-
tracting out to traditionally private entities.  For the first time in American 
law, entities in these types of privatization schemes are asserting state sove-
reign immunity as an affirmative defense in suits arising out of work per-
formed on behalf of the government.  As a consequence, there has been 
some confusion in the federal circuit courts concerning whether these enti-
ties are arms of the state for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment.  Because 
state sovereign immunity can prevent injured parties from having their cas-
es heard on the merits in federal court, courts should not extend state sove-
reign immunity to entities that the Eleventh Amendment does not cover.  
Moreover, because the arm-of-the-state test imposes costs on the judicial 
system, courts should not employ the test when there is an alternative, less-
costly approach.  This Comment makes four recommendations concerning 
state sovereign immunity and privatization that should assist federal courts 
and state legislatures in balancing the important judicial and governmental 
interests of fairness, efficiency, and proper deference to state sovereign im-
munity. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Until Margaret Thatcher became Prime Minister of the United King-
dom, the conventional wisdom was that the government—and not the pri-
vate sector—was best equipped to manage certain industries, such as the 
telecommunications industry and the utilities industry.1  Today, however, 
the reality is that governments throughout the world, and especially in the 
U.S., have not only relinquished control over these industries, but also over 
a number of other public industries.2 And, despite the fact that “privatiza-
tion has not proven to be a cure-all panacea for ineffective government,”3 
there is virtually unanimous agreement that privatization has become a val-
uable tool of government.4 Moreover, the impact of privatization has not 
                                                                                                                           
1
  See William L. Megginson & Jeffry M. Netter, From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical 
Studies on Privatization, 39 J. ECON. LITERATURE 321, 324 (2001) (“Although the Thatcher government 
may not have been the first to launch a large privatization program, it was without question the most 
important historically . . . . Thatcher adopted the label ‘privatization,’ which was originally coined by 
Peter Drucker and which replaced the term ‘denationalization.’”) (citations omitted); see also Sir 
Rhodes Boyson & Antonio Martino, What We Can Learn from Margaret Thatcher, Remarks at the 
Meeting of The Heritage Foundation’s Windsor Soc’y in Sea Island, GA (Oct. 3-6, 1999), in The Herit-
age Foundation Pol’y Archive, Nov. 24, 1999, available at http://www.heritage.org/research/politicalphil 
osophy/hl650.cfm.  As Boyson and Martino note: 
When Margaret Thatcher took office, there were 3 million private shareholders; when she left, 
there were almost 11 and a half million . . . .When the gas industry was launched, the shares were 
oversubscribed by 500 percent . . . . [Subsidized housing was] sold to tenants at knockdown prices, 
and between 1979 and 1989 owner occupation increased from 55 to 63 percent . . . . [B]etween 
1979 and 1987 the number of civil servants was reduced by 22.5 percent (732,000 to 567,000). 
Id. Although privatization did not thrive until the Thatcher government, arguments in favor of privatiza-
tion existed at English law and colonial law: 
In every great monarchy in Europe the sale of the crown lands would produce a very large sum of 
money, which, if applied to the payment of public debts, would deliver from mortgage a much 
greater revenue than any which those lands ever afforded to the crown. . . . When the crown had 
become private property, they would, in the course of a few years, become well improved and well 
cultivated. 
ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 824 (Penguin Group 1982) (1776). 
 
2
 Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 547 (2000) 
(“Virtually any example of service provision or regulation reveals a deep interdependence among public 
and private actors in accomplishing the business of government.”); Enrico C. Perotti, Credible Privati-
zation, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 847 (1995) (“Privatization has recently become the policy of choice in both 
developed and developing countries, and an urgent necessity for the economies of Eastern Europe.”); 
William L. Megginson, Think Again: Privatization, 118 FOREIGN POL’Y 14 (2000) (“Over the past two 
decades, the privatization of state enterprises has gone from novelty act to global orthodoxy . . . . The 
real question is how—not whether—to transfer state firms to private hands.”).  
 
3
 See Keon S. Chi, Kelley A. Arnold, & Heather M. Perkins, Privatization in State Government: 
Trends and Issues, SPECTRUM: THE J. OF STATE GOV’T 19 (Sept. 2003). 
 
4
 Id. at 20 (“[S]tate policymakers now tend to consider privatization as a cost saving device or as 
a way to manage their agencies and deliver public services without hiring new staff or experts in certain 
areas.  It appears that privatization has now become a less ideological, less partisan, pragmatic approach 
for policymakers to consider.”).  For theoretical and empirical accounts of why private entities some-
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been limited to any one level of government.  To the extent that privatiza-
tion “encompasses the range of efforts by governments to move public 
functions into private hands and to use market-style competition,”5 state 
governments have transferred a large number of traditionally public func-
tions to private firms by: (1) privatizing traditionally public entities, and (2) 
by contracting out to traditionally private entities.6 As of 2002, contracting 
out to traditionally private entities accounted for 86.9% of all state-level 
privatization schemes.7  
Some of the legal implications of the privatization-boom have been 
noted.8  Nevertheless, scholars and commentators have paid scant attention 
                                                                                                                           
times perform public functions better than government agencies, see E.S. SAVAS, PRIVATIZATION AND 
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS (2000) (providing a detailed account of privatization in general and 
public-private partnerships in particular, and arguing that the shift from public to private government 
improves the productivity of government agencies); Anthony Boardman & Aidan R. Vining, Ownership 
and Performance in Competitive Environments: A Comparison of the Performance of Private, Mixed, 
and State-Owned Enterprises, 32 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1989) (reviewing empirical findings and concluding 
that, in a competitive environment, state-run enterprises and partially-privatized enterprises perform 
substantially worse than fully-privatized enterprises); Wei Li & Lixin Colin Xu, The Impact of Privatiza-
tion & Competition in the Telecommunications Sector Around the World, 47 J.L. & ECON. 395, 395 
(2004) (citing INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS UNION (ITU), TRENDS IN 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS REFORM: CONVERGENCE AND REGULATION (1999); ITU, 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS REFORM: EFFECTIVE REGULATION (2002); ITU, TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
REFORM: INTERCONNECTION REGULATION (2001); PYRAMID RESEARCH, WILL THE INTERNET CLOSE 
THE GAP? (2000)) (evaluating data containing information on privatization from 177 countries and 
information on competition from up to 162 countries between 1990 and 2001 and concluding that full 
privatization improves the economic performance of a country’s telecommunications sector more than 
partial privatization).  The Supreme Court has also recognized the virtues of privatization. See Richard-
son v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 405-07 (1997). 
 
5
 Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 116 HARV. 
L. REV. 1271 (2003). Professors Megginson and Netter provide another useful definition: “Privatization 
can be defined as the government’s deliberate sale of state-owned assets or enterprises or to private 
economic assets.”  Megginson & Netter, supra note 1, at 1.  
 
6
 See Chi et al., supra note 3, at 15. Every U.S. state and commonwealth has privatized at least 
some services and programs. See KEON S. CHI, CINDY JASPER, MICHAEL J. SCOTT, COUNCIL OF STATE 
GOVERNMENTS, PRIVATE PRACTICES: A REVIEW OF PRIVATIZATION IN STATE GOVERNMENT 8, Fig. 6 
(1998), available at http://www.privatization.org/database/trendsandstatistics.html (last visited Mar. 27, 
2009).  As of 1997, the U.S. Virgin Islands had the lowest number of privatized programs (five).  Id.  
The State of Florida had the highest number (151).  Id. 
 
7
 See Chi et al., supra note 3, at 20. 
 
8
 See, e.g., Symposium, Redefining the Public Sector: Accountability and Democracy in the Era 
of Privatization, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1307 (2001); Symposium, New Forms of Governance: Ceding 
Public Power to Private Actors, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1687 (2002); Symposium, Public Values in an Era of 
Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1211 (2003); Freeman, supra note 2; Jody Freeman, The Contracting 
State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 155 (2001); Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative 
State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1 (2001); David J. Kennedy, Due Process in a Privatized Welfare System, 64 
BROOK. L. REV. 231 (1998); Ira P. Robbins, The Impact of the Delegation Doctrine on Prison Privatiza-
tion, 35 UCLA L. REV. 911 (1988); Dru Stevenson, Privatization of the Welfare System: Delegation of 
the Commercial Contract, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 83 (2003); Daphne Barak-Erez, A State Action Doctrine for 
an Age of Privatization, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1169 (1994); Sheila S. Kennedy, When Is Private Public? 
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to the question of whether quasi-government agencies, or so-called pub-
lic/private “hybrid” entities, should be accorded state sovereign immunity.  
This result is surprising when one considers that extending state sovereign 
immunity to an entity can have severe repercussions on the would-be plain-
tiff—he is barred from bringing a suit against that entity.  For this reason, 
“‘sovereignty’ has become an oppressive term in our courts.  A state gov-
ernment that orders or allows its officials to violate citizens’ federal consti-
tutional rights can invoke ‘sovereign’ immunity from all liability—even if 
such immunity means that the state’s wrongdoing will go partially or whol-
ly unremedied.”9 
In Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp.,10 the Supreme Court 
labored to develop a standard by which courts could determine whether an 
entity or state agency is an arm of the state entitled to state sovereign im-
munity.  Hess did not achieve its purpose because there has been some con-
fusion in the federal circuit courts over whether state sovereign immunity 
extends to private entities that perform work for the government.  Recently, 
the Ninth Circuit held that state sovereign immunity did not extend to a 
private entity,11 bringing itself in line with the First, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, 
and Tenth Circuits.12  The Eleventh Circuit is the only circuit to have ex-
tended state sovereign immunity to a private entity;13 all of the circuits have 
                                                                                                                           
State Action in the Era of Privatization and Public-Private Partnerships, 11 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. 
L.J. 203 (2001); Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal Accountability in an Era of Privatized Welfare, 89 CAL. 
L. REV. 569 (2001); Ronald A. Cass, Privatization: Politics, Law, and Theory, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 449 
(1998); Note, The Privatization of California Correctional Facilities: A Population-Based Approach, 18 
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 438 (2007); Jon Michaels, Deforming Welfare: How the Dominant Narratives of 
Devolution and Privatization Subverted Federal Welfare Reform, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 573 (2004); 
Alexander Volokh, Privatization and the Law and Economics of Political Advocacy, 60 STAN. L. REV. 
1197 (2008); Abigail Hing Wen, Suing the Government’s Servant: The Implications of Privatization for 
the Scope of Sovereign Immunities, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1538 (2003); Ellen Dannin, Red Tape or Ac-
countability: Privatization, Public-ization, and Public Values, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 111 
(2005); Dru Stevenson, Privatization of State Administrative Agencies, 68 LA. L. REV. 1285 (2008); Paul 
R. Verkuil, Public Law Limitations on Privatization of Government Functions, 84 N.C. L. REV. 397 
(2006); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367 (2003). 
 
9
 Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1426 (1987) (citing 
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890); Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 
U.S. 711 (1883)).  
 
10
 Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30 (1994). 
 
11
 See Del Campo v. Kennedy, 517 F.3d 1070 (2008). 
 
12
 See Fresenius Med. Care Cardiovascular Res., Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 322 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2003); 
United States ex rel Barron v. Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P., 381 F.3d 438, 439-42 (5th Cir. 2004); Brother-
ton v. Cleveland, 173 F.3d 552 (6th Cir. 1999); Takle v. Univ. of Wisc. Hosp. & Clinics Auth., 402 F.3d 
768 (7th Cir. 2005); United States ex rel. Sikkenga v. Regence Bluecross Blueshield of Utah, 472 F.3d 
702 (10th Cir. 2006); see also infra Part II.C.  
 
13
 See Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc. v. Beech St. Corp., 208 F.3d 1308, 1311 (11th Cir. 
2000) (setting forth a four-part test to determine whether a private entity contracted by the State is 
“contractually acting as [a] representative[] of the State”).   
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different arm-of-the-state tests;14 and the Ninth Circuit is the only circuit to 
have declined to apply the arm-of-the-state test to a private entity.15  This 
Comment attempts to reconcile this confusion by recommending an alterna-
tive approach to the arm-of-the-state inquiry when private entities perform-
ing work for the government invoke state sovereign immunity as an affir-
mative defense.   
This Comment has four parts.  Part I details the concept of state sove-
reign immunity, considering the origin of the doctrine at common law and 
the evolution of the doctrine in the American legal system.  Part II describes 
the problems courts face in determining whether an entity is a sovereign.  In 
so doing, it compares and contrasts landmark Supreme Court decisions in-
volving municipal corporations and Compact Clause entities that invoked 
Eleventh Amendment immunity as defendants in federal court.  It also 
summarizes five key decisions rendered in the federal circuit courts, each of 
which involved a private entity that asserted state sovereign immunity as an 
affirmative defense.  Two of these decisions involve traditionally public 
entities that the state sought to privatize or “spin off” by statute.  Three in-
volve traditionally private entities that the state contracted to perform a 
public function.   
Part III makes three observations concerning state sovereign immunity 
and the federal circuit courts’ arm-of-the-state jurisprudence.   First, state 
sovereign immunity does not extend to private entities.   Second, courts are 
applying arm-of-the-state analysis whenever an entity claims state sove-
reign immunity.  Third, an erroneous finding of state sovereign immunity 
threatens a state’s sovereignty.   
Part IV makes four recommendations.  First, courts should expressly 
acknowledge that state sovereign immunity does not extend to private enti-
ties.  Second, courts should adopt a per se rule against extending state sove-
reign immunity to traditionally private entities.  Third, courts should apply 
the arm-of-the-state test to traditionally public entities that the state has 
allegedly privatized.  Finally, when a state creates an entity to perform a 
government function, it should detail in the entity’s organic statute whether 
the entity is an arm of the state within the meaning of the Eleventh 
Amendment. 
                                                                                                                           
 
14
 See infra Part II.C. 
 
15
 See Del Campo, 517 F.3d at 1078; see also infra Part II.C.2. 
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I. STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY:  ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT 
A.  English Law and Colonial Law 
The concept of sovereign immunity at English common law is summa-
rized by remarks made in 1702 by Chief Justice John Holt:  “If the plaintiff 
has a right, he must of necessity have means of vindication if he is injured 
in the exercise and enjoyment of it.  Right and remedy, want of right and 
want of remedy, are reciprocal.”16  By Henry III’s reign, it was well estab-
lished that the King could not be sued without his consent; but sovereign 
immunity did not necessarily prevent an injured party from acquiring re-
lief.17  Because the King was regarded as the fountain of justice, he was 
obligated—by law and by conscience—to redress wrongs done to his sub-
jects.18  Indeed, an individual who had been injured by the King (and whose 
suit affected the Crown) could pursue his claims in regular courts.19  More-
over, when it was necessary for an individual to bring a suit against the so-
vereign, the King would routinely consent to suit if the claim brought 
against him made out a prima facie legal claim.20  In those instances, the 
King’s courts would provide the petitioner with redress in accordance with 
the substantive law.21  Thus, “the expression ‘the King can do no wrong’ 
originally meant precisely the contrary to what it later came to mean.  ‘It 
meant that the King must not, was not allowed, to do wrong. . . .’”22    
Despite the variety of procedures available at common law to those in-
jured by the King, the practice of obtaining redress for wrongs committed 
by the sovereign did not translate well in the American colonies, because 
there was not a King who could consent to suit.23  Nevertheless, American 
lawyers at the time of the founding were familiar with the doctrine of sove-
reign immunity.24  For this reason, there was dispute over whether Article 
                                                                                                                           
 
16
 CLYDE E. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 8 (1972) (quoting 
Ashby v. White, 87 Eng. Rep. 808 (Q.B. 1702)). 
 
17
 See Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. 
REV. 1 (1963). 
 
18
 See JACOBS, supra note 16, at 5. 
 
19
 See Jaffe, supra note 17. 
 
20
 See id.  
 
21
 JACOBS, supra note 16, at 6. 
 
22
 See Jaffe, supra note 17, at 4 (alteration omitted) (quoting Ehrlich, No. XII: Proceedings 
Against the Crown (1216-1377), at 74, in 6 OXFORD STUDIES IN SOCIAL AND LEGAL HISTORY (Vinogra-
doff ed., 1921)). 
 
23
 See id. at 2. 
 
24
 See JACOBS, supra note 16, at 7 (“The American edition of Sir William Blackstone’s Commen-
taries on the Laws of England was published in 1771 and 1772; this treatise . . . exercised great influ-
ence in the colonies . . . . From the maxim the king can do no wrong, he argued simply that ‘whatever 
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III, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution—which extends the federal judi-
cial power “to Controversies between a State and Citizens of another state . 
. . and between a State . . . and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects”25—
authorized suits against non-consenting states in federal court.26  At the time 
the Constitution was drafted, Alexander Hamilton took the position that the 
states retained their sovereignty: 
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty, not to be amenable to the 
suit of an individual without its consent. . . . ; and the exemption, as 
one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government 
of every state in the union.  Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of 
this immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain with the 
states . . . . The contracts between a nation and individuals, are only 
binding on the conscience of the sovereign, and have no pretension to 
a compulsive force.27 
On the other hand, Edmund Randolph and James Wilson—members of 
the Committee of Detail from which Article III, Section 2 originated—
interpreted Article III, Section 2 as making the states amenable to suit while 
establishing impartial tribunals.28 No consensus was reached concerning its 
meaning.29  Furthermore, it is unclear whether the states would have ratified 
the Constitution without sovereign immunity.30   
Five years after the Constitution was adopted, the Supreme Court was 
forced to decide whether Article III authorized a citizen of one state to sue 
another state without its consent.  In Chisholm v. Georgia,31  a citizen of 
South Carolina brought a damages action against the State of Georgia for 
breach of contract.  The Court rejected Georgia’s claim that a non-
consenting state was immune from suit by a citizen of another state.32  In a 
famous dissent, Justice James Iredell argued that the Supreme Court’s orig-
inal jurisdiction should be interpreted with reference to common law prin-
                                                                                                                           
may be amiss in the conduct of public affairs is not chargeable personally on the king, nor is he, or his 
ministers, accountable for it to the people.’”). 
 
25
 U.S. CONST., art. III, §2, cl. 1.   
 
26
 See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Assumptions of Federalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1763, 1784 (2006); 
see also JACOBS, supra note 16, at 28. 
 
27
 THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 450 (Alexander Hamilton) (Robert A. Ferguson ed., 2006). 
 
28
 See JACOBS, supra note 16, at 39.   
 
29
 See id. at 39 (“[N]o uniform understanding was reached concerning the meaning of the clause 
extending the judicial power of the United States to ‘controversies between a state and citizens of anoth-
er state.’”); see also Chemerinsky, supra note 26, at 1784 (“The dispute [at the ratifying conventions] 
was over whether the language of [Article III, Section 2, Clause 1] was meant to override the sovereign 
immunity that kept states from being sued in state courts.”). 
 
30
 See id. at 40.  
 
31
 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
 
32
 See id. at 480. 
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ciples.33  Assuming that “[a]ll the Courts of the United States must receive . 
. . all their authority . . . from the legislature only,”34 Justice Iredell con-
tended that Article III conferred jurisdiction to federal courts over certain 
claims but did not abrogate defenses.35  Under this view, the State of Geor-
gia would have been obligated to consent to suit by waiving its immunity 
because that was the customary practice at common law. 
The Chisholm decision “fell upon the country with a profound 
shock.”36  The State of Georgia, for instance, enacted a law forbidding any-
one from enforcing the judgment; those who violated the law were to be 
subjected to the death penalty.37  In any case, the most important reaction to 
Chisholm was unquestionably the proposal of a constitutional amendment 
to overrule the decision.  Indeed, after much debate between Anti-
Federalists and Federalists,38 the states ratified the following version of the 
Eleventh Amendment:  “The judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted 
against any one of the United States by Citizens of another State or by Citi-
zens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”39    
B.  The Supreme Court and the Eleventh Amendment 
By its terms, the text of the Eleventh Amendment appears to limit fed-
eral courts’ jurisdiction to suits against one state “by Citizens of another 
                                                                                                                           
 
33






 See Note, The Rehnquist Court’s Proper Restoration of State Sovereign Immunity, 5 GEO. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 205, 207 (2007) (citing 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 434-35). 
 
36
 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 720 (1999) (quoting 1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN 
UNITED STATES HISTORY 96 (rev. ed. 1926)); accord Hans v. Lousiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890); Princi-
pality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 325 (1934); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 
44, 69 (1996); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789-
1801 196 (1997) (“Newspapers representing a rainbow of opinion protested what they viewed as an 




 See Alden, 527 U.S. 706 at 720. 
 
38
 AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 334 (2005): 
Some arch-states’ rightists objected in principle to the notion that a state could ever be dragged in-
to federal court and forced to pay money, even in cases where the state had violated a federal law 
of the federal Constitution itself.  But this extreme faction did not command enough support. . . . 
Instead, just as moderate Federalists had compromised with moderate Anti-Federalists to find 
common ground on the bill of rights, so once again common ground was found, repudiating Chi-
sholm, but on a much narrower basis that even nationalists could live with. Had states’-rights ex-
tremists prevailed, the Eleventh Amendment would have read something like this: “No State shall 
ever be sued in any Article III court by any private party.” 
 
39
 U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
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State.”40  Yet, in Hans v. Louisiana,41 the Supreme Court interpreted the 
Eleventh Amendment to prohibit suits against a state by a private citizen.42  
In that case, Justice Joseph Bradley echoed Justice Iredell’s sentiment that 
Congress could not constitutionally enact a statute subjecting the states to 
suit in federal court.  In support of his position, he cited the large deficiency 
of historical evidence in support of the idea:  
Suppose that Congress, when proposing the Eleventh Amendment, 
had appended to it a proviso that nothing therein contained should 
prevent a State from being sued by its own citizens in cases arising 
under the Constitution or laws of the United States: can we imagine 
that it would have been adopted by the States?  The supposition that it 
would is almost an absurdity on its face.43 
Hans remains good law.44    
Nearly twenty years after Hans, the Supreme Court created an excep-
tion to state sovereign immunity by holding that plaintiffs could bring suits 
against state officials for injunctive relief.45  Even so, this so-called Young 
exception did not swallow the Eleventh Amendment.  First, under Hans, 
plaintiffs are required to allege that the state official against whom they are 
bringing suit violated federal law.46  Second, in Edelman v. Jordan,47 the 
Supreme Court held that “the Eleventh Amendment permits official capaci-
ty actions against state officials for prospective relief          . . . .”48  In any 
case, Young and its progeny had a profound impact on nation-state relations, 
eliciting an “outcry . . . reminiscent of that following the decision in Chi-
sholm v. Georgia.”49  Even so, the Supreme Court has imposed additional 
limitations on the scope of the Eleventh Amendment.  As of today, Con-
gress can abrogate state sovereign immunity under Section 5 of the Four-
                                                                                                                           
 
40
 See id.  
 
41
 Hans v. Lousiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
 
42
 See id. at 15. 
 
43
 Id.  
 
44
 See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002). 
 
45
 See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155 (1908). 
 
46
 See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). 
 
47
 Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). 
 
48
 HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR. & ELIZABETH J. NORMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE § 5.35 (2d 
ed. 2001). See also Edelman, 415 U.S. at 665-69. 
 
49
 JACOBS, supra note 16, at 146 (citation omitted). Nevertheless, Professor Jacobs notes that 
“[t]he reference was to events in North Carolina where resentment against the federal judiciary . . . 
appears to have been due not so much to Ex Parte Young as to the decision in McNeill v. Southern Rail-
road, 202 U.S. 543 (1906).” Id. at 195 n.5 (citation omitted). In that case, the Supreme Court “upheld a 
decree of the United States Circuit Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina prohibiting the 
enforcement of certain orders of the state corporation commission.” Id.   
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teenth Amendment.50  In addition, the federal judiciary defines the scope of 
Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment powers.51 
II. THE PROBLEM: WHEN IS AN ENTITY A SOVEREIGN? 
Because states are typically immune from suit under the doctrine of 
state sovereign immunity, the Supreme Court has been forced to decide 
whether state agencies or instrumentalities of the state that administer the 
states’ affairs are also immune from suit.  The Court has repeatedly ruled 
that, unlike arms of the state, counties and political subdivisions are not 
entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.52  Thus, the Supreme Court has 
endeavored to draw a line between arms of the state and political subdivi-
sions when determining whether an entity is entitled to state sovereign im-
munity. 
A.  What Are Arms of the State? 
The Supreme Court’s arm-of-the-state jurisprudence began in 1977 
when it decided Mount Healthy City School District Board of Education v. 
Doyle.53  In that case, an untenured Ohio school teacher sued the Mount 
Healthy City School Board on First and Fourteenth Amendment grounds 
after the school board refused to renew his contract.54  In a unanimous opi-
nion, the Supreme Court applied what appeared to be a balancing test to 
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hold that the school board was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immun-
ity.  The Court reasoned that the school board was more like a county or 
city than an arm of the state.55  Under Ohio law, political subdivisions were 
not part of the state.56  Moreover, even though Ohio funded and directed the 
school board, the school board was permitted to issue bonds and levy tax-
es.
57
  Thus, the Mount Healthy Court applied two factors: (1) how state law 
defined the entity; and (2) the degree to which the entity was financial in-
dependent. 
In Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,58 the 
Supreme Court again applied a balancing test to determine whether a so-
called Compact Clause entity was an arm of the state entitled to Eleventh 
Amendment immunity.  Pursuant to Article I, Section 10, Clause 3 of the 
Constitution,59 the State of California and the State of Nevada (and Con-
gress) created the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA) to regulate the 
development of the Lake Tahoe Basin region.60  Thereafter, several individ-
uals whose property was located in the region brought suit in federal district 
court, alleging that TRPA had engaged in conduct that destroyed the value 
of their property.61   
The Supreme Court declined to extend Eleventh Amendment immuni-
ty to TRPA.62  According to the Court, extending state sovereign immunity 
to an agency was inappropriate unless the states (and, in this instance, Con-
gress) intended to do so.63  Here, the Court considered the two Mt. Healthy 
factors but identified additional factors:  
(1) express provisions allocating responsibility for judgments; (2) the 
ratio of state to local members on the agency’s governing board; (3) 
whether the entity’s primary functions are traditionally state or local; 
and (4) the history of litigation between the state and entity.64 
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B.  Hess and Its Progeny: Modern Arm-of-the-State Analysis 
Shortly after Lake Country, the Supreme Court was again confronted 
with a Compact Clause entity that invoked state sovereign immunity.  In 
Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp.,65 two railroad workers filed 
personal injury actions under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act66 against 
their employer, the Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation (PATH).67  
The State of New York and the State of New Jersey created PATH to govern 
commercial facilities in the port of New York.68  PATH moved to dismiss 
the actions, claiming Eleventh Amendment immunity.69 
1.  The “Twin Purposes” of the Eleventh Amendment 
The Hess Court observed that, unlike Lake Country, “the indicators of 
immunity . . . [did] not . . . all point in the same way.”70  Accordingly, the 
Court looked to “the Eleventh Amendment’s twin reasons for being.”71  
Because it had previously held that a state’s dignity interest could not be 
implicated in the Compact Clause context, it looked solely to whether a 
judgment against PATH would affect the state’s treasury.  
The Court declined to extend Eleventh Amendment immunity to PATH 
solely because New York and New Jersey controlled it, reasoning that “ul-
timate control of every state entity resides with the State, for the State may 
destroy and reshape any unit it creates.  Political subdivisions exist solely at 
the whim and behest of their State, yet cities and counties do not enjoy Ele-
venth Amendment immunity.”72  Moreover, the Court found that PATH was 
financially independent—even though it dedicated much of its surplus to 
projects that New York and New Jersey might otherwise finance.73  Accord-
ing to the Court, “the proper focus is not on the use of [the entity’s] profits 
or surplus, but rather on its losses and debts.” 74  If the state is not obligated 
to pay the entity’s debts, then “the Eleventh Amendment’s core concern is 
not implicated.”75 
                                                                                                                           
 
65
 Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30 (1994). 
 
66
 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1988). 
 
67
 Hess, 513 U.S. at 33. 
 
68
 Id.  
 
69
 Id.  
 
70
 Id. at 44. 
 
71
 Id. at 47. 
 
72
 Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted). 
 
73
 Id. at 49. 
 
74




2009] Can Eleventh Amend. Immunity Extend to Private Entities? 221 
 
2. Control 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas 
dissented, arguing that the Eleventh Amendment bars federal jurisdiction of 
any suit against a state in “law or equity,” thus belying the claim that the 
primary concern of the Eleventh Amendment is the state’s treasury.76  In-
stead, the proper inquiry “is whether the State possesses sufficient control 
over the entity performing governmental functions that the entity may prop-
erly be called an extension of the State itself.”77  The dissenting justices 
explained: 
An arm of the State . . . is an entity that undertakes state functions and 
is politically accountable to the State, and by extension, to the electo-
rate.  The critical inquiry, then, should be whether and to what extent 
the elected state government exercises oversight over the entity.  If the 
lines of oversight are clear and substantial—for example, if the State 
appoints and removes an entity’s governing personnel and retains veto 
power over an entity’s undertakings—then the entity should be 
deemed an arm of the State . . . .78  
In any event, the dissent observed that the treasury factor was part of the 
equation.79  On the facts in Hess, it would have found PATH immune from 
suit.80  
3.  A Gloss on Hess: Legal Liability for Judgments 
The Supreme Court elaborated Hess in Regents of the University of 
California v. Doe81 when a New York citizen brought a breach of contract 
action in federal court against the Regents of the University of California 
and several individual defendants.  The plaintiff alleged that the University 
breached a contract by failing to employ him at a laboratory it operated for 
the federal government.82  The Energy Department agreed to indemnify the 
University of California for any damages awards associated with the opera-
tion of the laboratory.83  In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court held 
that the federal government’s promise to indemnify the state against litiga-
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tion costs did not eliminate its Eleventh Amendment immunity because it 
was still legally liable for judgments.84  
C.  A Circuit Split: Five Key Decisions 
Given the difficulties in determining whether to extend state sovereign 
immunity to Compact Clause entities, it is perhaps understandable that 
there has been some confusion concerning whether private entities are arms 
of the state when such entities perform a public function.  Because courts 
have not treated the issue uniformly, this Part selects and examines five 
cases from the federal circuit courts that involve private entities that in-
voked state sovereign immunity as an affirmative defense.85  The entities in 
the First Circuit’s and Seventh Circuit’s decisions are examples of tradition-
ally public entities that the state sought to privatize or “spin off” by statute.  
The entities in the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh circuits’ decisions involve 
traditionally private entities that the state contracted to serve a public func-
tion.  The decisions rendered in the Ninth and Eleventh circuits are ex-
amined first. 
1.  The Eleventh Circuit’s Shands Decision 
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Shands Teaching Hospital and Clin-
ics, Inc. v. Beech Street Corp.86 is the only case to have extended state sove-
reign immunity to a private entity.  While managing a state employee health 
insurance plan, Florida’s Department of Managements Services (DMS) 
hired Unisys—a private corporation—to pay health care providers for ser-
vices rendered to state employees and to provide state employees with a 
preferred provider organization (PPO) network.87  Unisys then subcon-
tracted Beech Street to institute the PPO network,88 which included Shands 
Hospital.89  
Shands Hospital sued Unisys and Beech Street when Unisys allegedly 
failed to pay for “covered medical services.”90  Unisys and Beech Street 
argued that the suit should be dismissed because they were arms of the 
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state.91  The Eleventh Circuit noted that it uses three factors to determine 
whether state sovereign immunity extends to entities other than the state: 
(1) how state law defines the entity; (2) what degree of control the 
State maintains over the entity; and (3) from where the entity derives 
its funds and who is responsible for judgments against the entity.92   
The court observed that “the pertinent inquiry is not into the nature of a 
corporation’s status in the abstract, but its function or role in a particular 
context.”93   
Although there was “no case on point,” the Eleventh Circuit concluded 
that the suit should be dismissed because Unisys and Beech Street were 
simply acting at the behest of the State, with Florida funding and retaining 
nearly complete control over the program.94  In addition, a favorable ruling 
on either of Shands’s claims would have implicated state funds.  First, a 
declaratory judgment would have affected the state’s treasury because it 
might have affected the number of payouts that Florida was required to 
make.95  Second, even if Unisys indemnified the state for the expenses, 
payment for Shands’s damages claim would have amounted to an obligation 
of the state.96   
2.  The Ninth Circuit’s Del Campo Decision 
The most recent decision involving a private entity was Del Campo v. 
Kennedy.97  After passing a statute criminalizing “the making, drawing, 
uttering, or delivery of any check, draft or money order . . . ‘with intent to 
defraud,’”98  the State of California authorized district attorneys to create 
“bad check diversion programs” in which the district attorneys could drop 
charges against those who wrote bad checks.99  Accordingly, the District 
Attorney in Santa Barbara hired American Corrective Counseling Services 
(ACCS) to run its diversion program.100  The contract between the District 
Attorney and ACCS expressly stated that ACCS was an “independent con-
tractor.”101  Moreover, the contract required ACCS to indemnify the county, 






 Id. at 1311 (citing Stewart v. Baldwin County Bd. of Educ., 908 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir. 
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to carry its own insurance, and to manage nearly every aspect of the pro-
gram.102   
While ACCS was operating the diversion program, a dispute arose be-
tween ACCS and an individual whom ACCS accused of having passed a 
worthless check.103  In particular, after disputing a collection fee levied by 
ACCS, Elena Del Campo brought suit against the District Attorney, ACCS, 
and several others for violation of her rights to equal protection and due 
process.104  ACCS and the District Attorney claimed state sovereign immun-
ity as arms of the state.105  The Ninth Circuit assumed that the district attor-
ney had acted as an arm of the state but held that ACCS was not entitled to 
state sovereign immunity.106  The court reasoned that state sovereign im-
munity does not extend to private entities because the purpose of sovereign 
immunity is to protect the state’s treasury and to accord the state a degree of 
dignity that is consistent with the status of sovereign.107  The court did not 
think that these purposes would be furthered by extending state sovereign 
immunity to ACCS because, as a private corporation contracted by the 
state, it was more removed from state power than counties or Compact 
Clause agencies—which are routinely denied state sovereign immuni-
ty.108   
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that, in the past, it had looked to the 
five factors to determine whether an entity is an arm of the state:109 
(1) whether a money judgment would be satisfied out of state funds; 
(2) whether the entity performs central governmental functions; (3) 
whether the entity may sue or be sued; (4) whether the entity has the 
power to take property in its own name or only in the name of the 
state; and (5) the corporate status of the entity.110   
The court concluded that only the second factor could ever be satisfied 
by a private entity.111  Moreover, because it had previously declined to 
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extend state sovereign immunity to a private entity when only the 
second factor had been satisfied, the court declined to apply the test on 
the ground that doing so would be a waste of judicial resources.112  In 
dicta, the court criticized the Eleventh Circuit’s Shands decision for hav-
ing used a functional approach in an Eleventh Amendment case.113   
3.  The Tenth Circuit’s Sikkenga Decision 
The Tenth Circuit has also determined whether state sovereign immun-
ity should extend to a private entity. In United States ex rel. Sikkenga v. 
Regence Bluecross Blueshield of Utah,114 a former employee of Regence 
BlueCross BlueShield of Utah (“Regence”) brought a false-claims115 suit 
against Regence, three Regence managers, and Associated Regional and 
University Pathologists (“ARUP”)—a laboratory owned by the University 
of Utah Medical Center.  Among other things, Edyth Sikkenga claimed that 
ARUP submitted false claims to Regence and that Regence paid them.116  
Utah’s Department of Health and Human Services had hired Regence to be 
its major Medicare Part B carrier,117 which made Regence responsible for 
processing and paying Medicare Part B claims and for ensuring that claims 
were eligible for reimbursement under the Medicare program.118  ARUP 
enjoyed almost complete autonomy in terms of its operations and funding.   
ARUP argued that the suit was barred because it was entitled to state 
sovereign immunity.  In light of the “coincidence of scope between the FCA 
and the Eleventh Amendment inquiries,” the court applied its version of the 
arm-of-the-state analysis:  
(1) the state’s legal liability for a judgment; (2) the degree of autono-
my for the state—both as a matter of law and the amount of guidance 
and control exercised by the state; and (3) the extent of financing the 
agency receives independent of the state treasury and its ability to 
provide for its own financing.119 
The court found that Utah would not be liable for any judgment 
against ARUP.120  First, Utah law established that any judgment against 
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ARUP would be satisfied out of ARUP’s treasury.121  Second, although dep-
letion of ARUP’s general treasury would require the state to further fund the 
Utah Medical Center and the University,122 it was bound by the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Regents of California v. Doe123 “to focus on legal liabili-
ty for a judgment, rather than on the practical, or indirect, impact a judg-
ment would have on the state’s treasury.”124   
The court further found that ARUP’s operations extended beyond edu-
cating the public.125  First, ARUP was a nationwide commercial laboratory 
that earned the majority of its revenue from operations outside the Universi-
ty.126  Second, ARUP possessed all of the hallmarks of a private entity—it 
could sue or be sued,127 it could enter into contracts,128 and it could maintain 
bank accounts.129  Finally, the ties between the University and ARUP arose 
as an incidence of ownership.130 
On the other hand, the court observed “a history of complex, intert-
wined relationships for funding capital improvement projects between the 
University and ARUP.”131  ARUP’s financial statements were audited by 
independent accountants and subsequently included as separate items in the 
University of Utah’s financial statements.132  Moreover, ARUP was de-
signed to be a “profit center” for the University Medical Center.133  
In the end, the court held that ARUP was not entitled to state sovereign 
immunity because Utah intended for ARUP to be financially independent 
and to compete in the private sector.134  
4.  The Seventh Circuit’s Takle Decision 
In Takle v. University of Wisconsin Hospital and Clinics Authority,135 
Joyce Tackle brought a damages action against the University of Wisconsin 
Hospital and Clinic Authority (the “Authority”) for violation of her rights 
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under Title I of the American with Disabilities Act while employed at the 
University of Wisconsin Hospital and Clinics in Madison, Wisconsin (the 
“Hospital”).  The Hospital was owned and operated by the Authority at the 
time of the alleged injury136 but was previously part of the University of 
Wisconsin, an arm of the state.137  The Wisconsin legislature had “spun off” 
the Hospital to the Authority by statute.138  The Hospital was authorized to 
operate like a private hospital, except that some of the Hospital’s board 
members were appointed by the governor, while others were members by 
virtue of holding public office.139  The majority of the Hospital’s employees 
continued to be deemed state employees,140 and the state continued to own 
the Hospital’s buildings.141  In addition, the Hospital was required to finance 
the university’s medical school and to provide state-mandated health ser-
vices.142   
Writing for the court, Judge Richard Posner framed the underlying le-
gal question:  
“The framers did not intend to abrogate [sovereign immunity]. . . . But 
what exactly is the ‘state’? The defendant is this case is . . . a hybrid 
entity; it has characteristics of both a state agency and a private foun-
dation.  Where on the public-private spectrum to locate it depends on the 
purpose of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, and that purpose is ob-
scure because “sovereignty” is an obscure concept when applied to a state 
of the United States. Is Wisconsin’s “sovereignty” impaired if the 
[H]ospital is suable in a federal court?  It would be if the [H]ospital were 
financed by the state so that any judgment against it would be paid out of 
state funds, unless the state had taken out some form of liability insur-
ance—but that would not negate its liability; it would be the premise of 
its liability, for unless it were liable it wouldn’t need liability insurance.143 
The Seventh Circuit noted the twin purposes of sovereign immunity—
protecting the state’s fiscal independence and protecting its dignity.  The 
court dismissed the notion of dignity as being “difficult to translate into an 
operational legal standard”144 but concluded that the state’s fiscal indepen-
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dence was not implicated, notwithstanding the fact that a judgment against 
the Hospital might impair its ability to continue to provide benefits.145  In 
addition, the court observed that there was nothing to indicate that the Hos-
pital was a part of state government.  First, a hospital is not inherently go-
vernmental.146  Second, the hospital’s organic statute authorized it to operate 
like a private hospital.147  Finally, the public characteristics of the hospital 
were merely incidental to the transition from public to private.148  
Taken together, the Seventh Circuit concluded that what it had was “a 
state’s creation of a private entity, with the state using its leverage as the 
creator of the entity to insist that [the hospital] serve the state’s interests as 
well as its own.”149  As a matter of public policy, the court concluded that 
privatized entities should not be permitted to enjoy the benefits of both be-
ing private and being immune from suit in federal court.150 
5.  The First Circuit’s Fresenius Decision 
Like Takle, Fresenius Medical Care Cardiovascular Resources, Inc. v. 
Puerto Rico151 involved a suit against a public entity that the state had most-
ly privatized.  Fresenius Medical Care Cardiovascular Resources (“FMC”) 
brought a breach of contract action against Puerto Rico and the Caribbean 
Cardiovascular Center Corp. (“PRCCCC”), and PRCCCC moved to dismiss 
the claim, contending that it was an arm of the state152 entitled to Eleventh 
Amendment immunity.153  PRCCCC’s enabling act154 did not state that 
PRCCCC was an arm of the state but provided that PRCCCC was permitted 
to enter into contracts with the state and to borrow money from the Com-
monwealth.155    
The First Circuit announced that it would follow the two-step analysis 
set forth in Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp.156—(1) whether the 
state clearly instructed the entity to share its sovereignty; and (2) whether 
the damages sought from the entity would be paid from the public trea-
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sury.157  As indicia of Puerto Rico’s intentions concerning whether 
PRCCCC was entitled to sovereign immunity, the court referred to how the 
Puerto Rico legislature structured PRCCCC.158  In so doing, it looked at the 
following factors: PRCCCC’s enabling act; state statutory law; state court 
decisions; PRCCCC functions; and control by the state.159  Because some of 
the indicia did not indicate that PRCCCC was an arm of the state, the court 
proceeded to the second stage of the analysis by examining “what [was] 
said by state law on the topic and what in fact ha[d] happened.”160  Ulti-
mately, the First Circuit ruled against PRCCCC, finding that PRCCCC’s 
“argument [was] simply that a judgment would deplete its operating funds, 
that the Commonwealth might choose to rescue it, and that this would indi-
rectly deplete the state treasury.”161  
III.  OBSERVATIONS 
This Part makes three observations concerning state sovereign immun-
ity and the federal circuit courts’ arm-of-the-state jurisprudence.  First, state 
sovereign immunity does not extend to private entities.  Second, courts are 
applying arm-of-the-state analysis whenever a private entity claims state 
sovereign immunity.  Third, an erroneous finding of state sovereign immun-
ity threatens a state’s sovereignty.   
A.  State Sovereign Immunity Does Not Extend to Private Entities 
State sovereign immunity does not extend to private entities—even 
when these entities perform work on behalf of the state.  First, extending 
state sovereign immunity to private entities does not serve either of the 
“twin purposes” of state sovereign immunity.  Second, in any given privati-
zation scheme, state governments do not exercise enough control over the 
entity as to clothe it with state sovereign immunity. 
1.  Extending state sovereign immunity to private entities does not  
serve the “twin purposes” of the Eleventh Amendment 
A state’s dignity and fiscal interests are not threatened when a court 
declines to extend state sovereign immunity to a private entity.  First, a state 
is not made to answer for a private entity’s wrongs when a private entity is 
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haled into court.162  Because “[t]he preeminent purpose of state sovereign 
immunity is to accord States the dignity that is consistent with their status 
as sovereign entities,”163 a state’s dignity is tarnished only when it is “re-
quired to answer the complaints of private parties in federal courts.”164  
Nevertheless, a state is not required to answer for private entities when such 
entities are sued in federal court. In the event of a lawsuit against the pri-
vate entity, the named defendant in the case would be the private entity ra-
ther than the state.  Moreover, the state would not be required to defend that 
entity.  
Second, states are not financially responsible for private entities.165   A 
private entity is “conceived as a fiscally independent entity” and is “fi-
nanced predominately by private funds.”166  To this end, private entities 
produce their own profits and do not depend on appropriations from the 
state government.167  In cases of traditionally public entities that the state 
has privatized, the newly-created entity performs work on behalf of the 
government because the government permits the entity to operate as a pri-
vate entity, not because the government funds the entity.168  Even if a state 
agrees (for one reason or another) to appropriate money to a private entity, 
the private entity’s existence does not depend on that appropriation because 
it is permitted to acquire funds from additional sources.169  Likewise, a state 
is not legally liable for a private entity’s debts.170  If a court issues a judg-
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ment against a private entity, the private entity is exclusively responsible for 
the payment of that debt.171  
 
2.  State governments do not exercise enough control over private  
  entities as to clothe them with state sovereign immunity 
 
In any given privatization scheme, a state government will not exercise 
enough control over a private entity as to clothe that entity with state sove-
reign immunity.  First, state governments do not exercise clear and imme-
diate oversight over private entities.  Apart from being obligated to perform 
a public function, a privatized entity need not seek the government’s per-
mission before acquiring property, governing itself, or participating in a 
business venture.172  Moreover, it is immaterial that the state for which the 
private entity is performing work could potentially terminate its operations.  
As Justice O’Connor noted in Hess, “[v]irtually every enterprise, municipal 
or private, flourishes in some sense at the behest of the State.  But . . . the 
Eleventh Amendment’s protections [do not] hinge on this sort of abstrac-
tion.”173 
Second, although states often retain the right to appoint representatives 
to traditionally public entities that it has privatized, such appointment pow-
ers do not amount to control over the entity.  When the government ap-
points individuals to positions in a private entity, these appointments do not 
have a direct impact on the entity’s conduct.174  To the contrary, the officials 
of a private entity (and not the state) are responsible for determining how 
the entity will behave.  This is especially the case when the “power is dif-
fused among different public officials who may hold quite different views 
of how the entity should conduct itself.”175  In the state sovereign immunity 
context, the Supreme Court has held that the power to appoint does not 
amount to control.176 
Finally, any public characteristics of an entity that the state has priva-
tized will be a product of the entity’s transition from public to private.177  In 
Takle, the Seventh Circuit observed that hospital’s employees continued to 
be deemed state employees because the State of Wisconsin wished to avoid 
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creating a new pension system.178  In effect, the state had indulged a fiction 
for purposes of continuity.  Such public characteristics do not indicate state 
control but rather represent an effort by the state to use its influence as the 
creator of the entity to require that the entity serve the state’s interests.179  
As Judge Posner observed in Takle, because these types of connections be-
tween a state and an entity are found in many privatization schemes, they 
do not “require that privatization be treated as a farce in which the privat-
ized entity enjoys the benefits both of not being the state . . . and of being 
the state.”180  
B.  Courts Are Applying Arm-of-the-State Analysis Whenever an Entity 
Claims State Sovereign Immunity 
Apart from the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Del Campo v. Ken-
nedy,181 federal circuit courts have been employing the arm-of-the-state test 
whenever an entity has claimed state sovereign immunity.182  In so doing, 
courts have applied the arm-of-the-state test to both traditionally public 
entities and traditionally private entities.  For example, the First and Se-
venth circuits have applied arm-of-the-state analysis to traditionally public 
entities that the state allegedly privatized or “spun off” by statute.183  The 
Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh circuits have applied arm-of-the-state analysis to 
traditionally private entities that the state contracted to perform a public 
function.184  No circuit (including the Ninth Circuit) has distinguished be-
tween traditionally private entities and traditionally public entities for pur-
poses of applying the arm-of-the-state test.  Thus, federal circuit courts have 
either applied or declined to apply the arm-of-the-state test without regard 
to the particular privatization scheme in question.  
C.  An Erroneous Finding of State Sovereign Immunity Threatens a State’s 
Sovereignty 
An erroneous finding that an entity is an arm of the state can have de-
vastating effects on a state’s sovereignty.  First, when a state transfers a 
traditionally public function to a private firm, an erroneous finding that the 
entity is an arm of the state can compromise the effectiveness of the privati-
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zation scheme.  Second, an erroneous finding that an entity is entitled to 
state sovereign immunity threatens the state’s treasury. 
1.  An erroneous state sovereign immunity determination can have an 
adverse impact on a state’s privatization scheme 
In Fresenius, the First Circuit noted that “[n]ot all entities created by 
states are meant to share in a state’s sovereignty.  Some entities may be part 
of an effort at privatization, representing an assessment by the state that the 
private sector may perform a function better than the state.”185  Accordingly, 
an erroneous arm-of-the-state finding not only violates the state’s sovereign 
immunity by undermining its intentions but also by compromising the ef-
fectiveness of that state’s privatization scheme.   
First, because Congress cannot abrogate state sovereign immunity pur-
suant to its Article I powers, an erroneous arm-of-the-state finding might 
prevent the private entity’s employees from enforcing the provisions of 
privately-enforceable Article I legislation.186  An inability to enforce these 
provisions might limit the number of employees who would be willing to 
work for the entity, thus undermining the state’s intentions and the effec-
tiveness of its privatization scheme.187   
Second, an erroneous arm-of-the-state finding might limit the private 
entity’s ability to operate as a private entity.  Absent an express waiver of 
sovereign immunity by the private entity, a private firm might refrain from 
to contracting with the entity knowing that the arrangement would not be 
governed by private law.188  As the First Circuit noted, “[t]he dollar cap on 
recovery found in many state sovereign immunity statutes would be a po-
werful disincentive to a private party to contract with an entity. . .”.189  
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2.  An erroneous state sovereign immunity determination threatens the 
state’s treasury 
An erroneous arm-of-the-state finding violates a state’s sovereign im-
munity by compromising the safety of its treasury.  If an entity is deemed 
an arm of the state, the state is liable for any judgment rendered against that 
entity.  Thus, where a state waives its sovereign immunity and consents to 
suit, an arm-of-the-state finding might subject the state to further liability 
than it intended.190  Presumably, erroneous arm-of-the-state determinations 
by federal courts would have the undesirable consequence of discouraging 
states from consenting to suit (and thus from redressing wrongs done to its 
subjects) in an effort to avoid a greater level of liability than it is willing to 
endure.     
IV.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
In light of the observations described in Part III, this Part makes four 
recommendations that should assist federal courts and state legislatures in 
balancing three critical (and often conflicting) interests—(1) giving proper 
deference to state sovereign immunity; (2) promoting fairness; and (3) in-
creasing efficiency.  First, courts should expressly acknowledge that state 
sovereign immunity does not extend to private entities. Second, courts 
should adopt a per se rule against extending state sovereign immunity to 
traditionally private entities.  Third, courts should continue to apply the 
arm-of-the-state test to traditionally public entities.   Finally, when a state 
legislature creates an entity to perform a government function, it should 
detail in the entity’s organic statute whether that entity is an arm of the state 
within the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment. 
Expressly acknowledging that a private entity cannot be an arm of the 
state will foster clarity among the courts.  Moreover, adopting a per se rule 
against extending state sovereign immunity to traditionally private entities 
would have several beneficent effects.  First, it would be more in keeping 
with the doctrine of state sovereign immunity—which, as noted in Part 
III.A, is not intended to extend to private entities.  Second, it would en-
hance the legitimacy and efficacy of the American legal system by advanc-
ing principles of fairness and promoting good behavior.  Third, it would 
allow for a more efficient federal judiciary.  
In turn, state legislatures can bolster these positive effects by stating in 
an entity’s organic statute whether that entity is an arm of the state.  Indeed, 
an express statement in an entity’s organic statute concerning its public or 
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private status for state sovereign immunity purposes would reduce the 
chances of a federal court erroneously finding (or not finding) that an entity 
is an arm of the state.   
  
A.  Courts Should Expressly Acknowledge That State Sovereign Immunity 
Does Not Extend to Private Entities  
The Ninth Circuit is the only circuit to have made a blatant declaration 
that state sovereign immunity does not extend to private entities.191 In so 
doing, it has said that applying arm-of-the-state to a private entity is “a cat-
egory error.  A category error . . . occurs when we place an entity in the 
wrong class or category of things, resulting in a fundamental error of 
analysis.  Examples of category errors include inquiring into the gender 
of a rock or into which day of the week is reptilian.”192  
The other federal circuit courts should also expressly acknowledge that 
state sovereign immunity does not extend to private entities.  
First, such an acknowledgement would foster clarity among the courts.  
Because of the complicated nature of the public-private distinction,193 this 
acknowledgement would serve as a reminder to courts that the purpose of 
the arm-of-the-state test is to determine whether an entity is a governmental 
body, not to determine whether a private entity is an arm-of-the-state.194  
Second, an express acknowledgement that private entities are not en-
titled to state sovereign immunity would advance principles of fairness and 
promote good behavior.  It is axiomatic that injured parties be able to obtain 
relief when they are wronged.195  Moreover, it is important that laws pro-
duce the proper incentives.  An express acknowledgement by the courts that 
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state sovereign immunity does not extend to private entities would enhance 
both of these goals: injured parties would be afforded the opportunity to 
obtain redress for their injuries, and private entities would be disallowed 
from enjoying both the benefits of operating as a private entity and being 
immune from suit in federal court.196  In turn, any given private entity 
would probably be more inclined to conform its conduct to the law, because 
the failure to do so might result in the entity being legally liable for damag-
es.    
Third, declining to extend state sovereign immunity to private entities 
would not reduce government efficiency by limiting the number of oppor-
tunities state governments would have to delegate public functions to pri-
vate entities.  Although private entities contracted by municipalities are not 
entitled to state sovereign immunity, there is no shortage of companies who 
are willing to perform work for these subdivisions.197  Moreover, while 
courts have routinely denied private entities state sovereign immunity, there 
has been no appreciable decline in the number of opportunities available to 
state governments in the private sector.198  
Finally, because government projects are massive and niche, they fre-
quently confer benefits on the entity performing the project that would oth-
erwise be unavailable to that entity.199  Thus, it is reasonable to expect that 
many companies would continue to contract with the government even if 
doing so would expose them to a greater degree of liability.     
B.  Courts Should Adopt a Per Se Rule against Extending State Sovereign 
Immunity to Traditionally private Entities  
Courts should adopt a per se rule against extending state sovereign 
immunity to traditionally private entities.  In implementing this rule, a court 
would refrain from applying arm-of-the-state analysis unless it concludes 
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that the entity in question is a traditionally public entity.  A court can deter-
mine whether an entity is traditionally public by asking if the entity was 
created by the state to perform a public function.  If the entity was not so 
created, the court would conclude that that entity is traditionally private and 
decline to extend state sovereign immunity to that entity without employing 
the arm-of-the-state test.  
1.  Accuracy 
First, a per se rule against extending state sovereign immunity to tradi-
tionally private entities would advance the important judicial goal of accu-
racy.  Applying the arm-of-the-state test to traditionally private entities risks 
inaccurate results because it requires the court to engage in a cumbersome 
fact-sensitive inquiry when the result of that inquiry should be certain.  Be-
cause traditionally private entities are perpetually private,200 courts need not 
employ an arm-of-the-state test to determine that the entity is not an arm of 
the state.  As the Ninth Circuit put it, applying arm-of-the-state analysis to 
these entities will always generate the same negative result.201   
To be sure, the majority of the courts’ decisions appear to have been 
correctly decided because few private entities have been permitted to shield 
themselves from suit by invoking state sovereign immunity.  Nevertheless, 
applying arm-of-the-state analysis to traditionally private entities has occa-
sionally led to the incorrect conclusion that a private entity is an arm of the 
state entitled to state sovereign immunity.202  A per se rule against extending 
state sovereign immunity to traditionally private entities would produce 
more accurate results because courts would cease to entertain claims (and 
subject themselves to persuasion) when an entity that is undeserving of 
state sovereign immunity asserts that it is an arm of the state.  In other 
words, a per se rule would eliminate the possibility of a court erroneously 
determining that a traditionally private entity is entitled to state sovereign 
immunity because it would not afford itself the opportunity to hold that it 
does.  Obviously, a reduction in the number of faulty determinations would 
advance principles of fairness because courts would not needlessly deprive 
injured parties from having their cases heard on the merits.   
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2.  Efficiency 
Second, a per se rule against extending state sovereign immunity to 
traditionally private entities would advance the important judicial goal of 
efficiency.  A per se rule would prevent the court from needlessly engaging 
in an onerous balancing test in order to discern whether an entity is an arm 
of the state entitled to state sovereign immunity.  In addition, litigants 
would not have to engage in laborious discovery tactics in an attempt to 
influence the court’s decision.  This result would be substantial because, as 
of 2002, 86.9% of privatization schemes involved contracting out to tradi-
tionally private entities.203 
C.  Courts Should Continue to Apply Arm-of-the-State Analysis to Tradi-
tionally Public Entities 
Courts should continue to apply the arm-of-the-state test to traditional-
ly public entities when those entities invoke state sovereign immunity.  In 
so doing, a court would refrain from applying the arm-of-the-state test un-
less and until it concludes that the entity in question is a traditionally public 
entity.  Like the determination of whether an entity is traditionally private,204 
a court can determine whether an entity is traditionally public by asking if 
the entity was created by the state to perform a public function. If the entity 
was so created, then the court would conclude that the entity is traditionally 
public and employ the arm-of-the-state test. 
Unlike the result generated by the application of the arm-of-the-state 
test to traditionally private entities, the result generated by the application 
of the arm-of-the-state test to traditionally public entities will not always be 
negative.  This different result is a product of the fact that it is not always 
clear whether a state government has “spun off” an entity to operate in the 
private sector.  Because of the elusive nature of traditionally public entities, 
the arm-of-the-state test would assist courts in determining whether a tradi-
tionally public entity has been privatized.  While the state need not do any-
thing to make a traditionally private entity private,205 the state must privatize 
a traditionally public entity in order to make that entity private. 
1.  Accuracy 
First, the arm-of-state analysis is well-suited to determine whether a 
traditionally public entity has been privatized because it asks the same 
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questions that one would expect from any inquiry into the private or public 
status of an entity.  Although the purpose of the arm-of-the-state test is to 
distinguish between governmental bodies, the different formulations of the 
arm-of-the-state test devised in the federal circuit courts can also be used to 
determine the public or private status of a traditionally public entity.  The 
First Circuit’s arm-of-the-state test is illustrative because it was applied in 
Fresenius to a traditionally public entity that Puerto Rico had allegedly pri-
vatized.  There, the First Circuit asked the following: (1) whether the state 
clearly instructed the entity to share its sovereignty, and (2) whether the 
damages sought from the entity would be paid from the public treasury.  As 
noted in Part II.C.5, structural indicators include the entity’s enabling act, 
state statutory law, state court decisions, the entity’s functions, and the 
amount of control the state exercises over the entity.  After employing its 
version of the arm-of-the-state test, the court concluded that the entity in 
question was not an arm of the state.  Based on the information it had ga-
thered, it could have also determined whether the entity had been priva-
tized.   
2.  Efficiency 
Second, applying the arm-of-the-state test to determine if a traditional-
ly public entity has been privatized would increase judicial efficiency.  Be-
cause the arm-of-the-state test will be employed whenever a court finds that 
a traditionally public entity has been privatized, the immediate application 
of the arm-of-the-state test would simplify the process by allowing the court 
to simultaneously determine (1) whether the traditionally public entity has 
been privatized and (if not) (2) whether the entity is an arm-of-the-state.  
The benefits of this approach are apparent when one considers the conse-
quences of adopting a different approach. 
The alternative to applying arm-of-the-state analysis to determine 
whether a traditionally public entity has been privatized is to employ a dif-
ferent test.  In effect, this would have the undesirable consequence of add-
ing another layer onto the arm-of-the-state analysis in cases where the court 
finds that the entity in question has not been privatized.  Indeed, in cases 
where the state has allegedly privatized an entity, a court would discern 
whether the entity in question has been privatized by the application of a 
fact-sensitive test that looks a lot like the arm-of-the-state test; it would then 
employ the arm-of-the-state test if it finds that the entity has not been priva-
tized.  This approach would be unnecessarily duplicative given the remark-
ably similar nature of the arm-of-the-state test and any other test designed 
to determine whether an entity has been privatized.  As noted above, a court 
can apply the arm-of-the-state test to simultaneously determine both wheth-
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er a traditionally public entity has been privatized and (if not) whether that 
entity is an arm-of-the-state.  
D.  State Legislatures Should Detail in an Entity’s Organic Statute Whether 
an Entity Is an Arm of the State 
Because an erroneous arm-of-the-state finding by a federal court can 
violate a state’s sovereignty,206 state legislatures should detail in an entity’s 
organic statute whether the entity is an arm of the state for Eleventh 
Amendment purposes.  Although federal courts have routinely referred to 
an entity’s organic statute as an indication of the state’s intent with respect 
to that entity’s arm-of-the-state status, state legislatures have so far failed to 
make any kind of declaration in state-created entities’ organic statutes con-
cerning whether those entities are entitled to state sovereign immunity.207  A 
short proviso at the end of the entity’s organic statute would make clear to 
federal courts the state’s intentions as to whether the entity is entitled to 
state sovereign immunity or is instead a product of privatization.  A provi-
sion concerning an entity that the state wishes to privatize might read as 
follows: “Because the foregoing entity shall operate as a private entity in 
the private sector, it shall not be deemed an arm of the state for purposes of 
the Eleventh Amendment.”  On the other hand, a provision concerning an 
entity that the state wishes to remain public might read as follows: “Be-
cause the foregoing entity shall be subject to continuing state control, it 
shall be deemed an arm of the state for purposes of the Eleventh Amend-
ment.”  Although these provisions would not be dispositive as to the public 
or private status of the entity,208 they would at least make known the state’s 
intentions concerning the entity, thereby reducing the likelihood of an erro-
neous arm-of-the-state finding by a federal court.  
                                                                                                                           
 
206
 See supra Part III.C. 
 
207
 See, e.g., Fresenius Med. Care Cardiovascular Res., Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 322 F.3d 56, 65 (1st 
Cir. 2003) (“The first step of the [arm-of-the-state] analysis concerns how the state has structured the 
entity . . . . After all, a state may easily make clear by statute its view that an entity is to share the state’s 
immunity.”); Takle v. Univ. of Wisc. Hosp. & Clinics Auth., 402 F.3d 768, 770 (7th Cir. 2005) (“It 
would be nice if the hospital’s organic statute stated outright that the hospital is a private entity rather 
than an arm of the state—that would resolve the issue—but it does not say that.”). 
 
208
 Of course, the question of whether an entity is entitled to state sovereign immunity is a ques-
tion of federal law. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 n.5 (1997) (“Ultimately, 
of course, the question of whether a particular state agency is has the same kind of independent status as 
a county or is instead an arm of the state, and therefore “one of the United States” with the meaning of 
the Eleventh Amendment, is a question of federal law.”).  
2009] Can Eleventh Amend. Immunity Extend to Private Entities? 241 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
This Comment has highlighted an area of confusion in federal circuit 
courts that has received insufficient scholarly attention.  Because privatiza-
tion is a valuable tool of state government, the question of whether state 
sovereign immunity extends to private firms will continue to confront 
courts.  This Comment has argued that courts should expressly acknowl-
edge that state sovereign immunity does not extend to private entities.  Such 
a declaration would foster clarity among the courts as to how to approach 
the arm-of-the-state inquiry and would promote principles of fairness by 
providing injured parties with an opportunity to have their cases heard on 
the merits in federal court.  Moreover, courts should adopt a per se rule 
against extending state sovereign immunity to traditionally private entities 
while reserving the arm-of-the-state analysis for traditionally public entities 
that the court has allegedly privatized.  This approach would not only be 
consistent with constitutional principles, but it would also promote accuracy 
and efficiency by reducing both the risk of judicial error and the number of 
occasions on which the court is required to employ the arm-of-the-state test.  
In addition, when a state creates an entity to perform a government func-
tion, it should detail in that entity’s organic statute whether the entity is an 
arm of the state.  A statute that accounts for the Eleventh Amendment would 
reduce the chances of a federal court erroneously finding (or not finding) 
that the entity is entitled to state sovereign immunity.  
 
